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The achievement of effective control over marine pollution de-
pends upon agreement both on adequate anti-pollution regulations
in matters such as hull design, manning requirements and permis-
sible discharge rates, as well as agreement on an effective enforce-
ment procedure. A major area of disagreement concerns the body
which should be responsible for prescribing the appropriate stand-
ards-the alternatives being basically either individually, by
coastal States, or an international agency.
Agreement on the body to be given competence to prescribe such
rules is, in practice, the more difficult problem on which depends,
to a large extent, agreement on the bodies to be given competence
to enforce the rules.' However, the concept of "enforcement" juris-
diction has recently undergone considerable refinement and, while
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1. This split into prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction and enforcement
jurisdiction is traditional in international law. See the Case of the S.S.
"Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 9. Cf. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdic-
tion in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES Couns 1 (1964), reprinted in
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it would be wrong to suggest that these recent changes hold the
key to agreement on the regulation of marine pollution, it seems
reasonable to claim that the additional flexibility which they intro-
duce should facilitate accommodation of conflicting national inter-
ests and the establishment of an effective regime for the control
of marine pollution. This article will review the present position
under customary international law and under the conventions deal-
ing with pollution, and then examine the three main trends which
appeared during the 1974 United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea.
II. THE PosIION UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Initially, it can be simply stated that the flag State has legislative
jurisdiction over its vessels wherever they might be, and also has
enforcement jurisdiction over its vessels except when they are in
internal waters and territorial seas of third States.
Coastal States clearly have both legislative and enforcement ju-
risdiction over vessels in their internal waters and territorial seas.2
The exercise of this jurisdiction over foreign ships in the territorial
sea is limited by art. 19 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention,
but coastal States are entitled to arrest any person or conduct any
investigation in relation to a pollution offense committed within
the territorial sea, subject to obligations to advise the consular au-
thorities of the flag State if the captain of the ship so requests
and to pay due regard to the interests of navigation. Where a ship
outside the territorial sea causes pollution within the territorial sea
it will be subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the coastal State,
though not to its enforcement jurisdiction,3 for example, in the
same way as a man in State X shooting and wounding another
across the border in State Y would be liable to prosecution in State
Y, although he could not be arrested by the authorities of State
Y until he came within their national boundaries. Jurisdiction over
ships in ports and internal waters which have committed pollution
offenses within the territorial sea is more easily exercised and is
not subject to limitations under the Convention or principles of in-
2. Cf. art. 1, 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Territorial Sea Conven-
tion].
3. Cf. the Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.1.J., Ser. A, No. 9.
ternational comity.4
If the coastal State fails to apprehend the vessel within the ter-
ritorial sea it may exercise its right of "hot pursuit" into the high
seas.5 If the ship nonetheless escapes the enforcement jurisdiction
of the coastal State, or if the act resulting in the pollution of the
territorial sea took place outside that area and the ship was never
subject to the State's enforcement jurisdiction, then the State seems
to have two ways of prosecuting the matter.0 First, it may request
the flag State to institute proceedings when the ship returns to
its ports; should the flag State accede to the request it would apply
its own law to the alleged infringement. Unfortunately, some flag
States are unable or reluctant to exercise effective control over
their vessels, even when documented evidence of violations of regu-
lations is provided by the requesting State. Secondly, the coastal
State may solicit the aid of a third State within whose jurisdiction
the offending vessel may later fall. The coastal State has no right
to commence criminal7 proceedings in its own name in the courts
of such third State, since this would involve the courts in assisting
States in the performance of acts of sovereignty in foreign countries
in derogation of the host State's territorial supremacy,8 and the
third State would have no .jurisdiction over the offense at all. It
appears that States may agree to assume the prosecution of an of-
fense which took place outside their jurisdiction with the consent
of the State which has jurisdiction9 so long as this does not infringe
the rights of other States. Thus, if State A asked State B to prose-
cute X, a national of State C, for an offense committed within the
jurisdiction of State A, and State B agreed (X being within its
enforcement jurisdiction), State C could validly object that the pro-
4. There is a rule of international comity according to which States nor-
mally refrain from exercising their jurisdiction over ships in their ports in
respect of offenses which do not disturb the "good order" of the coastal
State-the so-called "internal economy" rule. See the United Kingdom re-
ply to the Hague "Questionnaire" of 1930, in A. McNAIR, II INTERNATIONAL
LAw OPnNONS 194 (1956).
5. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, art. 24.
6. In civil actions proceedings may be instituted against a sister ship
owned by the same company. An extension of this principle to criminal
cases would be most valuable.
7. "Criminal" proceedings here include proceedings to recover penalties
due to the State by way of compensation for pollution damage, these being
analogous to proceedings under revenue laws, which are not enforced by
foreign States. Cf. MANN, supra note 1, at 124; and A. DICEY & J. MoRRIs,
THE CoNFICr or LAws 79 (9th ed. 1973).
8. Cf. MANN, supra note 1, at 124.
9. Cf. the European Convention on the Punishment of Road Traffic Of-
fences, Eua. T.S. No. 52 (1964), and the European Convention on the Trans-
fer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 709 (1972),
both of which provide foi the assumption of proceedings.
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ceedings were contrary to international law-being an unlawful ex-
tension of the jurisdiction of State A or State B,10 or being incon-
sistent with basic concepts of territorial sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion. Similar problems exist regarding the enforcement by States
of judgements passed in criminal matters, whether in the presence
of the accused or not, by the courts of another State; that is, while
municipal laws generally have not allowed for such enforcement,"
there seems no reason why they should not do so subject to the
consent of the States concerned.
It is fairly clear that a State may request another State to assist
in investigating an alleged offense, and in other preparatory mat-
ters such as interrogation of witnesses, service of documents and
so forth, although it is probably true that a State cannot undertake
such activities within the jurisdiction of another without its con-
sent.
12
In contrast to the rules applicable to jurisdiction over pollution
of the territorial sea, the question of jurisdiction over ships on the
high seas and polluting those seas is quite simple: only the flag
State has jurisdiction.' 3 Where any such pollution presents a grave
threat to a neighboring coastal State, that State may decide to
act against the ship, perhaps justifying its action by reference to
principles of self-defense or necessity. However, as has been
shown,14 the former is quite inappropriate, only being available
against unlawful acts or omissions of another State, which is un-
likely to be the case. The latter is only allowable when the strin-
gent conditions of necessity have been fulfilled. Further, both are
justifications for specific acts which are otherwise unlawful and
cannot form the basis for the establishment of a permanent juris-
dictional zone.15
10. Depending on whether the public law of State A or State B was ap-
plied, the 1972 European Convention provides that the State assuming the
prosecution should apply its own law.
11. See the European Convention on the International Validity of Crim-
inal Judgments, Eum T.S. 10 (1970).
12. See the fascinating case of U.S. v. Hay, 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 630
(1974).
13. Cf. art. 6, 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
14. Brown, The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon, 21 CURRENT LEGAL PROB-
LEmS 113 (1968).
15. Mr. Trudeau, Press Release, April 15, 1970, and Background Notes of
April 8, 1970, on the passing of the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Act,
1970. See 9 INTL LEGAL MA SERiAL 600 (1970).
The position in pollution zones set up apart from the territorial
sea, perhaps as part of an economic zone, would depend upon the
precise nature of the claim. Thus, a claim to legislative and en-
forcement jurisdiction,16 if upheld, would give the coastal State the
same rights over pollution as it has in its territorial sea; a claim
to legislative jurisdiction only would give the coastal State the same
rights as it has over pollutors who pollute its national waters but
do not enter those waters; and a claim to enforcement jurisdiction 7
only would allow the coastal State to exercise such control as was
necessary to prevent or punish infringement within its territorial
sea of its pollution regulations.
Ill. TiB PosrrIoN UNR CoNVENTiONs DEALING
WITH POLLUTION
It has been seen that under customary international law, jurisdic-
tion over ships is limited to coastal and flag States, although either
may request the assistance of other States. This sharing of jurisdic-
tion necessarily forms the basis of the enforcement provisions of
conventions dealing with pollution of the seas. Thus, the 1954 Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil,18 which related, broadly speaking, to sea areas within 50
miles from the nearest land,19 provides that any discharge of oil
prohibited by the Convention "shall be an offense punishable under
the laws of the relevant territory in respect of the ship" 20-the rele-
vant territory being the State in which a ship is registered, or
whose nationality is possessed by an unregistered ship.2' Apart
from the jurisdiction of the flag State utilized by the Convention,
it is provided that "[n]othing in the present Convention shall be
construed as derogating from the powers of any Contracting Gov-
ernment to take measures within its jurisdiction in respect of any
matter to which the Convention relates or as extending the jurisdic-
tion of any Contracting Government. '22 Thus, the Conventional
rules are to be enforced primarily by an exercise of flag State juris-
16. E.g., the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Act, 1970.
17. Cf. The British view of the "contiguous zone" provisions of the Terri-
torial Sea Convention in Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 8 IN'TL & Comp. L.Q. 73 (1959); Oda, The
Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 11 IN'rL & ComP. L.Q. 131 (1962).
18. 327 U.N.T.S. 3; the Convention was amended in 1962, and is in force
in this amended form; see U.K.T.S., No. 59 (1967).
19. 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
327 U.N.T.S. 26.
20. Id. art. VI (1).
21. Id. art. 11 (1).
22. Id. art. XI.
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diction, but without prejudice to the jurisdiction of coastal States
over their national waters. The Convention also formalizes the
right of States to call upon the flag State to act against contraven-
tions of the Convention rules by its ships, by requiring the Gov-
ernment of the "relevant territory" when furnished with particu-
lars in writing of such contravention, to investigate the matter and,
if sufficient evidence is available, to take proceedings against the
owner or master of the ship as soon as possible and inform the
party furnishing the information of the result of such proceedings.
23
This position is not changed by any of the proposed amendments
24
to the Convention. The 1954 Convention therefore leaves enforce-
ment in the hands of the flag and coastal States and in no way
extends either enforcement or legislative jurisdiction as it exists
under customary international law. It does, however, modify the
principle of international comity 25 according to which States nor-
mally refrain from exercising the local jurisdiction over vessels in
their ports by allowing the port State to inspect the oil record book,
which includes details of any discharges of oil, of vessels of any
other party to the Convention. 26 Thus, under the 1954 Convention,
the only occasion on which a State has the right to arrest and prose-
cute foreign ships for a contravention of the Conventional rules
is when such a vessel, having polluted its territorial sea, is within
its territorial sea.
The 1969 Brussels Convention on Intervention on the High Seas
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 27 allows parties to "take such
measures on the high seas as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate
or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coastline or related
interests" from oil pollution following a maritime casualty.28 Quite
apart from the limitations imposed by the fact that the Convention
relates only to maritime casualties, and that only States' "coastlines
or related interests" may be protected, the Convention is couched
in the language of self-defense and necessity, and seems to envisage
only physical acts against the ship. There is no suggestion that
23. Id. art. X.
24. 1969 Amendments, IMCO Res. A.175 (VI) (1969); 1971 Amendments,
IMCO Res. A.246 (VII) (1971).
25. See note 4, supra.
26. 1954 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,
art. IX, 327 U.N.T.S. 10.
27. 9 Ihf'L LEGAL MATERams 25 (1970).
28. Id. art. I.
the Convention creates any jurisdiction over such casualties, but
simply a statement of the manner in which a right to act against
casualties beyond the State's jurisdiction must be exercised. Coastal
States may well have jurisdiction over the vessel under customary
international law; for instance, if the pollution reaches their terri-
torial sea.29 The Convention was extended to cover pollution or
threat of pollution by substances other than oil in the 1973 proto-
colYo
The 1969 Brussels Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage3 1 contains interesting provisions relating to jurisdiction
which, although they only relate to civil proceedings, provide an
interesting precedent for extensions of criminal jurisdiction. En-
forcement is again left with flag and coastal States, which are re-
quired to ensure that vessels sailing under their flags, and all ships
entering or leaving their ports, are carrying certificates attesting
that the owner's liability for oil pollution damage is covered by
insurance or other financial security.3 2 So far as proceedings under
the Convention are concerned, it is provided that where pollution
damage has been caused or measures have been taken to prevent
or minimize such damage in the territorial sea of one or more of
the parties, "actions for compensation may only be brought in the
courts of any such Contracting State or States; 383 thus preventing
claims in the courts of the flag State. Final decisions of the courts
of Contracting States are to be recognized and enforceable in each
Contracting State34-a necessary provision since, where actions are
brought against the owner in more than one State he will constitute
a compensation fund in any one of those States to be distributed
among successful claimants in all such States.3 5 There does not
appear to be any reason why the courts of one State should not
recognize such judgments of courts of another State, although the
tendency is to pass municipal legislation to this effect.36 An analo-
gous scheme for criminal proceedings would be most useful and
the recent proposals for port State jurisdiction represent something
along these lines.
29. See text accompanying note 3, supra.
30. 13 NT'L LEGAL MATRIALS 605 (1974).
31. 9 IN'L LEGAL Mi ErAmxs45 (1970).
32. Id. art. VII (10), (11) at 54-55.
33. Id. art. IX at 56.
34. Id. art. X at 56-57.
35. Id. art. V at 48-51.
36. Cf. the U.K. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, § 13(3),
which extends the provisions of the 1933 Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act to cases arising under the Brussels Civil Liability Con-
vention.
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The 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter 37 requires permits
to be issued by a State in respect of matter intended for dumping
which is either loaded in its territory, or loaded by a vessel or air-
craft registered in its territory or flying its flag when the loading
occurs in the territory of a State not party to the Convention.38
States are required to apply measures necessary to enforce the Con-
vention in these cases, and also against vessels, aircraft and fixed
or floating platforms under their jurisdiction which are believed
to be engaged in dumping.3 9 The Convention thus adheres to the
traditional bases of jurisdiction but, in expressly recognizing the
need to develop procedures "for the effective application of this
Convention particularly on the high seas" 40 it acknowledges the
shortcomings of these bases as the foundation of an effective regime
for the control of marine pollution.
The most recent, and most ambitious, global convention on ma-
rine pollution is the 1973 London Convention on the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships.41 This Convention, which regulates all
forms of pollution from ships except dumping, and will thus sup-
plant the 1954 Convention,42 is also based upon a combination of
flag and coastal State enforcement. Thus, article 4 requires viola-
tions of the Convention to be prohibited under the law of the Ad-
ministration of the ship concerned, and by the law of the State
within whose jurisdiction the violation occurs. Coastal States are
given the choice of proceeding with an action under their own law,
or reporting the matter to the Administration of the ship. Where
the Administration is informed of a violation of the convention,
wherever that violation took place, it is obliged, if sufficient evi-
dence is available, to take proceedings against the ship concerned
and to promptly inform the party which furnished the information
and IMCO. The Convention expressly provides that parties may
inspect ships in their ports or offshore terminals,43 and that they
may also make such an inspection where a request to do so, accom-
37. 11 INTXL LEGAL MATERIALS 1291 (1972).
38. Id. art. VI.
39. Id. art. VIII.
40. Id. art. VII.
41. IMCO Doc. MP/CONF/,WP.35.; 12 INT'L LEGAL MATE R s 1319 (1973).
42. Id. art. 9 (1).
43. Id. art. 6 (2).
panied by sufficient evidence that the ship has discharged harmful
substances in any place is received from any party.1 4  (Evidence
of an actual breach under the Convention is not required.) Viola-
tions discovered as a result of an inspection are to be reported to
the requesting State, if any, and the Administration which is
obliged to commence proceedings. Ships unduly delayed by the
exercise of these enforcement measures are entitled to compensa-
tion for any loss or damage suffered.4 5 The Convention, like the
Dumping Convention, is stated to be without prejudice to the pres-
ent or future views of any State concerning the law of the sea,40
and has an interesting flexibility in the provision that "the term
jurisdiction shall be construed in the light of international law in
force at the time of application or interpretation of the present Con-
vention. '47 This will allow the Conventional regime to accommo-
date itself to the development of concepts such as pollution zones
and economic zones which may occur after the Convention comes
into force.
The major pollution conventions are, as has been seen, based pri-
marily on flag State enforcement, recognizing coastal State jurisdic-
tion, and expressly stating the right of States to inspect vessels in
their ports and offshore terminals. Similarly, the 1958 Geneva Con-
ventions impose a general obligation on States to "draw up regula-
tions to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from
ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration
of the sea bed and its subsoil."48 These measures will clearly be
applied by the flag State only on the high seas, 49 by coastal States
in relation to pollution arising from the development of the con-
tinental shelf,50 and by both flag and coastal States in relation to
pollution occuring within the jurisdiction of the latter.5 '
IV. DEFiciiEcis OF THE PRESENT BASES OF ENFORCEMENT
The present jurisdictional bases of schemes for the prevention
of pollution are unlikely to support an effective legal regime. The
44. The Spanish delegation was probably correct in stating that "the
rights granted to the port authority were not the only ones and did not
affect its rights in territorial seas nor exclude the other rights of port States
under international law."-that is, that art. 6 affirms part of the wider
rights of inspection that States have. MP/CONF/SR.11, at 5.
45. 12 iT'L LEGAL MATERiAs 1319.
46. Id. art. 9 (2).
47. Id. art. 9 (3).
48. Art. 24, 1958 Convention of the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
49. Id. art. 6.
50. Art. 5, 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
51. See introduction, supra.
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jurisdiction of coastal States over adjacent waters is, of course, lim-
ited, and even if, as seems likely, some sort of economic zone beyond
the territorial sea is allowed, this would extend for a maximum
of 200 miles from the coast. Although such a 200 mile zone would
cover all the semi-enclosed seas, for example the Mediterranean,
the North Sea and the Gulf of California, which, being almost sur-
rounded by land tend to trap pollution and are therefore especially
vulnerable,52 it would leave the open oceans subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of flag States. It is also uncertain how successfully
coastal States will be able to police any wider zones which they
may claim-a problem made even more difficult by the obstacles
to the enforcement of foreign penal judgements and the provision
of lesser measures of judicial assistance.
Although it is certainly true that the high seas can absorb more
pollution than other sea areas, it is still necessary that they should
be protected from excesses of pollution. 53  The usefulness of flag
State jurisdiction for this purpose is seriously prejudiced by the
continuing growth of "flag of convenience fleets." One of the char-
acteristics of a State offering flags of convenience is that it "has
neither the power nor the administrative machinery effectively to
impose any government or international regulations; nor has the
country the wish or power to control the (shipping) companies
themselves."54 It is important to distinguish States offering flags
of convenience from tax havens-the latter enforcing shipping reg-
ulations on safety, pollution and so forth, but giving favourable
tax treatment to companies operating from their territory. Liberia
and Panama are the leading flag of convenience States, together
having over one sixth of the world tonnage in 1971. Bermuda and
the Bahamas are among the leading tax havens, these territories,
together with Gibralter, having a total of approximately one half
of one percent of the world tonnage in the same year. Tax havens
are, however, growing rapidly in importance. 55
52. Alexander, Regionalism and the Law of the Sea, 2 OCN DEV. &
INT'L L.J. 151 (1974).
53. Cf. Lanctot, Marine Pollution: A Critique of Present and Proposed
International Agreements and Institutions, 24 HAST. L.J. 67 (1972).
54. CownnrEE OF INQunIY INTO SHIPING [THE ROCHDALE REPORT] 1970,
adopted by the OECD study on Flags of Convenience in Maritime Trans-
port 1971, reprinted in 4 J. MAR. L. & Comm. 231 (1972).
55. OECD study, supra note 54.
Over 20% of the world's tonnage sails under flags of convenience,
and there has been much criticism of their poor safety record. The
1973 shipping casualty statistics showed that Cyprus, a relatively
small "convenience" State, lost more ships in that year than any
other State, and 7 of the 21 ships lost in January 1974 were regis-
tered in Cyprus.56 Although it would be wrong to suggest that
all ship owners who register their ships under convenience flags
do so in order to avoid the more stringent safety and manning re-
quirements imposed by other States-since shipowners have every
interest in securing the safety of their vessels-it would, perhaps,
be fair to say that the authorities of such States do not exercise
a sufficient degree of control over their ships to form an effective
basis for the control of marine pollution. This is not to say that
convenience States do not enact appropriate legislation, but that
such legislation is not effectively enforced. It is impossible for any
State to supervise all its vessels at all times during their voyages,
but pollution offenses may be detected at sea by vessels or aircraft
of other States and reported to the flag State, which can arrest
the offending ship when it comes back to its home port. However,
not only are convenience States sometimes unwilling to commence
proceedings, but the ship may not appear within the waters of the
convenience State with which, by definition, it has no real link,
for many months.
V. PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea saw
a number of different approaches to the problem of effectively con-
trolling marine pollution. Three proposals have been selected to
represent the major types of jurisdictional provisions suggested;
these proposals are based on refinements of flag or coastal State
jurisdiction and on the creation of port State jurisdiction.
Strengthening Flag State Jurisdiction
First, the draft articles put forward by a number of European
countries5 7 seek to improve the present position by strengthening
the flag State's control over its vessels. Article 6 provides:
56. See the statement by the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) to the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO, March 29,
1974 [hereinafter I.C.F.T.U. Statement]; see also the letter from Mr. C.H.
Blyth, General Secretary, International Transport Workers Federation, in
SEAm RDU, Winter 1973.
57. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Ireland,
Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, U.K., working paper on the high seas. U.N.
Doe. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.54 (1974).
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1. Every State is obliged effectively to exercise its jurisdiction and
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag.
2. In particular the flag State shall... take the following action
in respect of ships flying its flag:
[there follow specific duties to register and inspect ships, ensure
that they are adequately manned and equipped, and]
(e) cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified
person... into every maritime casualty or incident of naviga-
tion on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and caus-
ing loss of life or serious injury to nationals . . . or shipping
... of another State or to the marine environment;
(f) assume juisdiction under its municipal law over each such
ship and over the masters, officer and crew in respect of admin-
istrative, technical and social matters concerning the ship and
(g) take the necessary measures to ensure that the master and
officers are fully conversant with and obliged to observe the ap-
propriate applicable international regulations concerning the
safety of life at sea, the prevention and control of marine pollu-
tion and the maintenance of communication by radio.
The proposal may serve some purpose in specifying the obligations
of the flag State, which are intended to supplement those of coastal
States acting in the areas under their jurisdiction. For example,
articulation of the obligation to hold inquiries into maritime casual-
ties would seem to be valuable, since "Panama, Lebanon, Somalia
and Cyprus have yet to hold an official public investigation into
even one maritime loss despite the fact that the incidence of casual-
ties and losses under those flags are the highest in the world."
58
The proposals are not, however, likely to be effective. There is no
reason why States which have not exercised effective control over
their ships in the past should do so under this proposed scheme.
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas stipulates that "[t]here
must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in par-
ticular the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and con-
trol in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying
its flag."59 Yet, this obligation has not been fulfilled. Proposals
by the International Law Commission to introduce a sanction of
non-recognition (that is, a provision that in the absence of such
a genuine link effective control States would not be obliged to rec-
ognize the national character from which flows the inviolability of
58. I.C.F.T.U. STATEMENT.
59. Art. 6, 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 88.
ships on the high seas) were rejected by the Geneva Conference.00
The present draft makes no provision for a sanction against breach
of the obligations of the flag State, merely stating in article 4 that:
A State which has reasonable grounds to suspect that proper juris-
diction and control has not been exercised in accordance with this
Convention may report the facts to the flag State and request it
to investigate the matter further. Upon receiving such a request,
the flag State shall investigate the matter, take any action neces-
sary to remedy the situation and notify the requesting State of the
action taken.
Recognizing the inadequacy of this procedure, draft articles sub-
mitted by the Federal Republic of Germany0 ' require States to issue
certificates of compliance with "regulations established in accord-
ance with [the Convention to be established by the Conference] "02
and impose liability on the State for damage resulting from a fail-
ure to control the issue of such certificates:
Art. 1(3). If a State has issued a certificate for a ship flying its
flag which does not comply with the requirements of the regula-
tions and the ship causes pollution of the marine environment, the
issuing State shall be internationally responsible for damage to
other States and their nationals resulting from the pollution inci-
dent and shall pay compensation accordingly, unless the pollution
incident was not due to the failure to comply with the require-
ments.
Such a provision would be of limited efficacy, especially since
many pollution incidents are due, not to failure to comply with
construction and manning regulations, but to deliberate disregard
for discharge regulations or to simple negligence. Although a State
could not certify that a ship would observe regulations in the fu-
ture, it is obliged under article 1(1) of the German draft to "deny
the right to fly [its] flag to ships which do not comply with such
regulations." This could only be effective if States were to effec-
tively exercise their jurisdiction and control over their ships, which
is the very object which the draft seeks to attain. Even if liability
did fall upon the flag State under article 1(3), this only arises in
cases of damage to "States and their nationals", in which case the
victims of pollution would be able to proceed against the pollutor
himself.
Is anything to be gained from removing such actions from the
jurisdiction of municipal courts to an international plane where
problems of acquiring evidence, securing attendances and enforcing
judgements are so much greater, and the chances of successful ac-
60. See the excellent discussion by Mxyuas, THE NATIONALr=Y OF SHnPs,
ch. V (1967).
61. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.7 (1974).
62. Id. art. 1 (1).
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tion so much less? The problems of assessing damage are bound
to be complicated, and likely to result in liability for only the most
direct losses, so excluding liability for the general deterioration of
the oceans under the cumulative effects of pollution which is a most
important matter for effective control. Provision for inspection of
ships in the ports, offshore terminals or internal waters of a State
where there are clear grounds for suspecting that the condition of
the ship does not substantially correspond with the requirements
for the grant of the certificate, or reasonable grounds for believing
that the ship has violated discharge regulations, 8 are likewise of
little value, since the inspecting State is not given the right to pro-
ceed against the ship unless it has violated discharge regulations
within that State's territorial sea. In other cases, the State can
only report the matter to the flag State which is then obliged to
take appropriate action against the ship.64 The German draft arti-
cle III provides what may be a more effective sanction:
Art. MI(1). If a ship does not carry a valid certificate... States
may deny such ship entry to their ports or offshore terminals, or
passage through their territorial sea.
This would give all States through which a ship passed the oppor-
tunity of imposing some sanction for non-compliance with the con-
ditions upon which the valid grant of a certificate depends, and
would give an important right to exclude potential pollutors from
national waters and a valuable incentive to ship owners to comply
with the Convention regulations. It would not, however, assist the
prosecution of any pollutors who were allowed into the territorial
sea, or of vessels polluting the high seas.
Extending Coastal State Jurisdiction
A second approach to increased control over vessels involves an
expension of coastal State jurisdiction, and has come to be known
as the "zonal approach". 65 The proposal is that States be given
jurisdiction beyond their territorial seas, either in a specific pollu-
tion zone or in an economic zone within which States have control
over most, if not all, activities connected with the "economic" uses
63. Art. HT, A/CONF.62/C.3/L.7 (1974).
64. Id. art. 11 (3), art. DI (2), art. IV.
65. See Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea
Conference, 68 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1974), for a useful summary of this ap-
proach and of other matters under discussion at Caracas.
of the area. This supplements the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag
State outside these areas of national jurisdiction. Although some
proposals place the sea and seabed beyond national jurisdiction
under the control of an international authority, which would exer-
cise this control either to the exclusion of or concurrently with
that of flag States, agreement on such an international authority
in the foreseeable future seems to be unlikely. The zonal approach
was used in draft articles sponsored by ten States at Caracas. 60
These envisaged control of pollution by both coastal and flag States:
Art. MI
(1) States shall take all necessary measures to prevent pollution
of the marine environment from any source ....
(2) States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that activi-
ties under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to areas
beyond their national jurisdiction, including damage to other States
and their environment, by pollution of the marine environment.
The draft goes on to provide for the establishment of a zone within
which States have jurisdiction to adopt and enforce legislation
against "all persons, natural and juridical, vessels, installations and
other entities"6' 7 for the purpose of "protecting and preserving the
marine environment and preventing and controlling pollution."0
Such a regime has the same shortcomings as any other, including
the present regime, based upon a sharing of jurisdiction between
flag and coastal States, that is, a lack of effective control over ships
flying convenience flags and certain obstacles to cooperation be-
tween States in prosecuting ships which pollute national waters.
These problems are exacerbated by the increased width of the zone
which the coastal State has to police, 69 and the increased impor-
tance of agreement on the body competent to prescribe rules ap-
plicable within the zone. The present draft gives the coastal State
competence to prescribe "reasonable and non-discriminatory laws
and regulations" for the zone "where internationally agreed rules
and standards are not in existence or are inadequate to meet special
circumstances"7 0 but this solves nothing. Who is to decide whether
the rules are reasonable, whether internationally agreed rules are
adequate, and whether special circumstances exist? The grant of
competence to coastal States in such vague terms is unlikely to be
66. Canada, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, New Zealand, Phil-
ippines, and Spain; Draft Articles on the zonal approach to the preservation
of the marine environment. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.6 (1974).
67. Id. art. VII.
68. Id. art. VI.
69. The coastal State is obliged to exercise such control within the waters
which it claims: see the comments of Judge Fitzmaurice on the territorial
sea in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1973] I.C.J. 27.
70. Art. VI (3) (b) (ii), A/CONF.62/C.3/L.6 (1974).
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acceptable to the major maritime States, and even if it were, the
proposed regime would not be a great improvement upon the pres-
ent position.
Port State Jurisdiction
The third approach departs from the traditional bases of jurisdic-
tion by allowing prosecutions of offenders by "Port States"-that
is, by any party to the Convention in whose ports the offender is
found. The proposal is found in the Greek draft articles on the
enforcement of provisions for the protection of the marine environ-
ment71 submitted to the Caracas conference. This was not the first
time that such a proposal was advanced. Extensive discussion of
port State jurisdiction took place during the 1973 London Confer-
ence on Marine Pollution, although eventually the proposal was
shelved, apparently because it was thought more appropriate to
deal with it at Caracas.7 2 The concept also appeared in earlier pro-
posals to the U.N. Seabed Committee, notably from the United
States73 and the Netherlands,7 4 and the 1971 Maltese Draft Ocean
Space Treaty75 which seems to envisage a similar method of en-
forcement by providing that vessels traversing the international
ocean space beyond the limits of national jurisdiction and flying
the flag of a State which does not effectively exercise control over
its vessels may be subject to proceedings before the proposed In-
ternational Maritime Court. It is clear, in the treaty, that it would
not be left to the delinquent flag State to arrest such ships for
the offenses which took place beyond the limits of coastal States'
jurisdiction.
The Greek draft may be taken as a most recent manifestation
of a move away from complete reliance on coastal and flag State
jurisdiction led, somewhat surprisingly, by the North American
71. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.4 (1974).
72. Unfortunately no records of the proceedings of the committees are
available, but see the draft amendments to art. 4 from Canada, Netherlands
and Japan, IP/CONF/C.1/W.P.20; Canada, MP/CON'/C.1/WP.25; Aus-
tralia, Canada and New Zealand, MP/CONF/C.1/WP.34; and the draft reso-
lution on enforcement in ports, from Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Ireland,
Trinidad & Tobago and United States, MP/CONF/C.1/WP.58. See also the




States.76 The draft attempts to deal with marine pollution from
all sources, and for this purpose distinguishes four categories of pol-
lution. First, land-based pollution, which is to be regulated by the
State in which the source of the pollution lies;77 secondly, pollution
arising from the exploration and exploitation of the seabed, which
is to be regulated by the flag and coastal States concerned; 7 and
thirdly, pollution caused by dumping is to be regulated, as in the
1972 Convention, by flag and coastal States.79 These categories are
regulated on the traditional bases of flag and coastal State juris-
diction, but the fourth category, pollution from ships caused other-
wise than by dumping, receives novel treatment.
The regulation of pollution from ships is primarily the obligation
of the flag State, which is to prosecute violations either on its own
initiative or at the request of other States under article 4:
Art. 4--Primary Obligation
(1) Regulations adopted in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention for the protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment from pollution shall be primarily enforced by the flag
State which has a right and obligation to this effect.
(2) At the documented request of any State the flag State has an
obligation to institute proceedings against the owner or master of
any ship registered within its territory or flying its flag for the al-
leged violation of such regulations and inform the requesting State
of the action taken upon such request.
Such a request may follow an actual sighting of the violation, or
result from an investigation of the ship by a State under article
5, which provides:
(2) The coastal State has within areas under its national jurisdic-
tion the right to inspect a ship registered in the territory or flying
the flag of another State where serious pollution has been caused
by such ship in the above areas.
(3) The port State has the right to inspect any ship while in its
ports or at its offshore terminals.
Although such rights of inspection exist under customary interna-
tional law, it is an important innovation for them to be so fully
spelled out.
The treatment of proceedings against pollutors is at the heart
of proposals for port State jurisdiction. Article 6 (1) provides that:
76. Cf. the United States statement to the 1973 London Conference, MP/
CONF/SR.2, and the Canadian comments on their working paper, A/AC.
138/SC.III/L.26 in the Seabed Committee Report, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 21,
at 213, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972). See also the summary records of Com-
mittee 3 at Caracas, A/CONF.62/C.3/SR.1 (1974).
77. Art. 1, A/CONF.62/C.3/L.4 (1974).
78. Id. art. 2.
79. Id. art. 3.
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Where a violation of regulations concerning discharge of pollutants
at sea is committed by a ship within the internal waters or the ter-
ritorial sea of a contracting State proceedings against such ship
may be instituted by the flag State, the coastal State or, at their
documented request by any port State.
Thus, in providing that a port State can proceed against a ship
within its enforcement jurisdiction with respect to events which
took place beyond its legislative jurisdiction under customary inter-
national law the article removes the obstacles to the assumption
of proceedings by foreign States. A major advantage of the Greek
draft is that it accommodates the interests of maritime States by
reserving certain rights to the flag State. Thus, a violation beyond
the territorial sea but within the economic zone of a coastal State
must, under article 6(2), be prosecuted
... by the flag State on the documented request of the coastal
State within the economic zone in [sic] which the violation occur-
red. If no action is taken within six months from the receipt of
such request proceedings shall be instituted by the coastal State or,
at its documented request, by any port State.
Further, under article 6(3), violations beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction can only be proceeded against by the flag State on its
own initiative or at the documented request of another party. In
addition to violations of discharge regulations on the high seas, vio-
lations of regulations concerning ship design, construction, equip-
ment, manning or any matter other than discharge, are also within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State. In case of violation
of "non-discharge" regulations, the flag State is to act
on its initiative or at the documented request of any contract-
ing State within the area of national jurisdiction in [sic] which such
violation resulted in pollution or serious danger of such pollution.80
These jurisdictional provisions preserve the interests of both coastal
and flag States without jeopardizing the effective enforcement of
pollution regulations.
This reciprocal enforcement scheme is completed by article 8,
which provides that any sentence passed against a pollutor in ac-
cordance with the draft articles
... shall be enforced by any port State at the request of the State
the appropriate authorities of which issued such sentence.
The possibility of double jeopardy is avoided by article 7, which
80. Id. art. 6 (4).
prohibits all States from commencing proceedings against an of-
fender once another State has done so. Useful as the innovations
of articles 6 and 8 are in securing more effective regulation of pol-
lution, they do not and cannot overcome the obstacle of the right
of non-party States to object to the use of the provisions against
their nationals.8' This does not mean, of course, that such an obsta-
cle should be allowed to stand in the way of such an improvement
in the present regime.
VL CONCLUSION
It has been noted above that the present regime, based on flag
and coastal State jurisdiction over pollutors, is deficient in several
respects. Flags States are sometimes unable to institute proceed-
ings against their vessels which may not visit their home ports for
many months, and some States appear unwilling to do so even when
the opportunity arises. Additionally, flag States cannot detect vio-
lations of pollution regulations, which may occur at any point on
a ship's voyage, without the cooperation of coastal States. Coastal
States only have jurisdiction in a belt of water adjacent to their
coasts, and any widening of this belt in the interests of pollution
control brings with it increasingly difficult problems of effectively
policing the belt as well as the great problem of international agree-
ment on the body to be given competence to prescribe rules for
the belt.
Against this background, port State jurisdiction has a number
of advantages. Firstly, the need to detain ships in transit for arrest
or inspection is minimized; such actions may take place at any port
on the ship's scheduled voyage. In particular, the competence given
to the port State provides a suitable alternative to the inspection
of suspected pollutors on the high seas-a difficult procedure which
maritime States would be likely to oppose strongly.82 Secondly,
the burden on coastal States of policing their adjacent waters,
which burden in the case of developing States with wide economic
zones may be severe, is reduced, since they are given the right to
the assistance of port States. Thirdly, increasing the number of
potential prosecutors should facilitate the control of pollution and
circumvent the problems created by States which are unable or un-
81. See introduction, supra.
82. Although some fisheries conventions allow such inspection, and even
arrest of offending vessels, cessation of the violation would, in most cases,
remove the need for the fishing vessel to remain in the area; violations of
pollution regulations are incidental to the "larger purpose" of maritime
transport, and inspection on the high seas is therefore far less likely to be
tolerated by maritime States.
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willing to effectively exercise their jurisdiction over their ships.
Fourthly, it may be that port State jurisdiction, in offering in-
creased control over pollutors, may lead to a reduced demand for
extensive zones of enforcement jurisdiction off coastal States.
The cautious approach of the Greek draft is likely to be most
acceptable, but more radical proposals might be considered. For
example, the port State might be given the right to proceed against
pollutors on its own initiative for violations of discharge regulations
wherever that violation occurred, or where the violation occurred
on the high seas. Alternatively, it might be given such a right if
no proceedings have been instituted by the State which has the
primary right to act within six months from the date of the viola-
tion or documented report of the violation. While modifications
of the scheme could lead to tighter controls over pollution, they
may well be less acceptable than the "middle way" of the Greek
draft.8 3 It must be stated, however, that the value of port State
jurisdiction, and its acceptability, would be greatly increased if
agreement were reached on internationally prescribed regulations
which such States would enforce. The advantages introduced by
the acceptance of port State jurisdiction could be obtained in a
piecemeal fashion apart from any general convention on the law
of the sea, but they would provide a firm and effective basis for
any such future convention and therefore deserve careful considera-
tion.
83. See the discussion in Port State Jurisdiction, a paper presented to
the 1974 New Delhi Conference of the International Law Association by the
British branch of the Association.
